This is an area we did not explore in our earlier paper, which focused on cyclical dollar bear markets. Predicting a cycle that occurs once every 18 years is already challenging; anticipating structural shifts that may happen only once every century or two is even harder. Yet in today’s multipolar world, the persistence of a single dominant currency at the centre of the global financial system looks increasingly anomalous. That raises the risk that change is coming. In this section, we examine several interconnected risks to the dollar’s position in the world.
The erosion of dollar dominance is distinct from a conventional dollar bear market. We have had three dollar-bear markets since the Nixon shock (1971, 1985, and 2002), and the US dollar was still the dominant
currency throughout this entire period.
Centrality is hard to measure, but economist Ken Rogoff’s shorthand method of looking at which central banks use the US dollar as their exchange rate anchor or reference currency is a good measure of what he calls a “portmanteau measure of dominance.”3 That’s because national central banks have a thorough knowledge of their own economies and the global financial system. By this logic, the dollar’s central role in the financial world began to shift around 2015, when the People's Bank of China (PBoC) started to make its currency more flexible. This shift was solidified when Russia invaded Ukraine, and US$300 billion worth of Russian central bank reserves were frozen, a warning for ‘sovereign fiduciaries’ everywhere. The rise of gold since 2021, driven by central bank buying and defying its typical correlation with real interest rates, suggests that gold has risen in the hierarchy of safe assets for sovereigns. In fact, by some measures, gold has overtaken the euro as a reserve asset.4
One way dollar centrality could erode is through China loosening its ties to the dollar. As the renminbi dollar exchange rate becomes more volatile, other Asian countries may also choose to strike a new balance, given China's importance in global trade.
Figure 5: The dollar’s vast footprint as an anchor or reference currency, 2019
Expanded dollar bloc
The dollar bloc comprises countries where the US dollar acts as a de facto anchor for monetary policy, even if their currencies are not formally pegged to the dollar. Monetary authorities in these countries closely
monitor dollar movements due to its impact on trade, inflation, and financial stability. For example, Brazil regularly adjusts monetary policy due to dollar-driven commodity prices and inflation changes; India’s central
bank intervenes frequently to manage rupee volatility linked to dollar fluctuations.
Left dollar bloc
The ‘left dollar bloc’ category includes countries that previously used the US dollar as an anchor for monetary policy but shifted away over time. Two notable examples are Canada and Mexico, both significant US trading partners. Canada abandoned its fixed exchange rate with the US dollar in 1970, shifting to a floating system to gain greater monetary independence amid rising inflationary pressures. Similarly, Mexico maintained a dollar peg until 1976, but inflation, fiscal deficits, and currency pressures compelled it to move to a floating rate, allowing more flexibility in managing economic volatility.

Joined dollar bloc
Countries categorised as ‘joined dollar bloc’ adopted the US dollar as a monetary anchor following economic instability or crises. After the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis, Indonesia abandoned its managed float for a
freely floating rupiah but regularly intervened to stabilise the currency. This informal anchoring to the US dollar helped control inflation and restore investor confidence, though Indonesia never formally pegged or dollarised.
China
China operates a managed float system. Each morning, the People’s Bank of China sets a central US dollar/CNY reference rate (midpoint), and the renminbi is allowed to trade within a narrow band (typically ±2%) around that reference. The central bank then intervenes, through state banks or policy tools, to keep the RMB within that band and smooth abrupt dollar-driven moves.
Source: Updated from Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2019. Ninety One, July 2025.
Domestic policy shifts
But perhaps the greatest threats to the dollar's position in the world come from within, not from without. The selection of Stephen Miran as head of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors gave ballast to those who worried about dollar centrality because of explicit policy positions he once advocated publicly. In his notable November 2024 paper, A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System, Miran advocated taxing dollar inflows, essentially imposing a levy on foreign capital entering the United States. The rationale was rooted in the argument that the dollar’s status as the world’s primary reserve currency creates persistent, inelastic demand for US assets, which keeps the dollar overvalued and forces the US to run chronic trade deficits. This overvaluation undermines American manufacturing and the tradable sector by making US exports less competitive. In other words, Miran explicitly highlighted dollar centrality as a negative for the economy.
Miran’s thinking did not come from nowhere. He drew on the work of economist Michael Pettis, who has long argued that global imbalances are driven by surplus countries’ policies and the reserve currency role.
Rebalancing requires managing capital flows, not just trade. The idea of taxing capital inflows has also appeared in US policy debates: in 2019, Senators Josh Hawley and Tammy Baldwin proposed measures to tax
foreign purchases of US assets for the same reason. While the bill did not advance in Congress, it marked a significant shift in US policy thinking toward managing capital flows away from a laissez-faire approach.
While Miran, once in the administration, disavowed his paper as a guide to policy, the idea of taxing foreign capital recurred in May 2025. At the time, a draft US fiscal reconciliation bill was sent from the House to the Senate with a provision known as Section 899. This would have allowed the US to impose higher taxes on foreign investors and companies from countries deemed to have ‘unfair’ or ‘punitive’ tax policies towards US firms, such as the so-called digital services taxes. The policy would have progressively raised taxes on dividends and interest from US stocks and some corporate bonds held by affected foreign investors by five percentage points annually, up to a maximum of 20 percentage points. It would also have ended current tax exemptions for sovereign wealth funds.
In the end, Section 899 was stripped from the final version of the reconciliation bill. But its inclusion, however temporary, underscores how quickly anti-inflow proposals can move from fringe policy papers into near-term legislative drafts.
If the United States wanted less foreign ownership of US assets, it could hardly do better than to pursue a policy like Section 899. Such a move would increase US term premia and give ballast to the ‘sell dollar’ trade for years. Yes, Section 899 was partly about giving President Trump more leverage against trading partners that are seeking to tax US corporations and individuals, which itself would throw sand in the wheels of the global economy. Nevertheless, a Section 899-type policy would add new risks to foreign holdings in the US (adding those risks to foreign holdings is, in fact, the point). The proposal may return in a new form or under different legislative cover. The bigger takeaway is that US policymakers are increasingly willing to contemplate leaning against the dollar’s global status rather than shoring it up.
Fed independence
In addition to proposals to tax inflows, there are growing risks to Fed independence. The willingness of both Democrats and Republicans to challenge the Fed’s independence, with the former tilting the Fed towards a greater focus on the environment, inequality and social justice, and the latter tilting the institution towards lower interest rates, is already contributing to questions around institutional direction.
The Supreme Court’s Wilcox case in the first half of 2025 was a narrow miss and exemplified the risks involved. Wilcox and Harris were dismissed officials who argued that if the president’s removal power extended to them, it could be used to dismiss top officials at the Fed. They reasoned that Wilcox’s National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Harris’s Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) were independent federal bodies with statutory protections.
The Supreme Court’s ruling drew a sharp distinction between the Fed and other agencies, allowing the president to remove officials from agencies such as the NLRB and the MSPB but explicitly exempting the Federal Reserve, describing it as a ‘uniquely structured, quasi-private entity’ with a distinct historical tradition in dicta, or passing remarks, thereby signalling to the executive that it would not sit idly by if Fed independence were to be challenged. That has diminished the threat to Fed independence but not entirely removed it.
America’s debt trajectory
Finally, America’s growing debt trajectory increases the salience of downside tail risks for the US dollar. US debt dynamics were already under strain from the interest rate reset following the period of very low long-term real interest rates. The willingness of the Biden administration and now the Trump administration to run large fiscal deficits is decreasing confidence that the US will be able to stabilise debt/GDP. The scale of the fiscal consolidation required is immense. A debt scenario analysis we ran in January suggests that stabilising debt/GDP would need something like 3% real GDP growth, 10-year yields under 4%, inflation north of 2.5%, and a primary budget consolidation of about 1%. If growth is lower, then the other factors must compensate. Given there is no net fiscal consolidation in the budget reconciliation bill this year, even including tariff revenues, fiscal risks are growing, not shrinking.
3 This time really is different for the dollar, writes Kenneth Rogoff. The Economist.
4 Gold overtakes euro as global reserve asset, ECB says. Financial Times.