In financial markets, the clearest expression of US exceptionalism has been the prolonged and significant outperformance of American equities over the past decade. Using the framework underpinning our capital market assumptions, we can break down the sources of equity market returns — helping us understand what has driven this outcome and what it might mean for US and other regional markets over the next ten years.
We begin by turning back the clock to consider how our framework would have viewed US return prospects before the era of exceptionalism took hold. From there, we deconstruct the drivers of equity returns to better understand what propelled US equities to the top of the global leaderboard.
This analysis also reveals that European equity performance has been exceptional — though in a very different sense. As major policy shifts take shape across the continent, investors are weighing the possibility of a structural change in Europe’s growth trajectory. In the final section, we place this potential inflection point in a historical context and consider the precedents for such transformations.
US exceptionalism in equity returns
For this analysis, we focus on the 10 years to 31 December 2024. This aligns with our forecast horizon and captures the period in which US equity outperformance was most pronounced.
The first lens through which we assess US exceptionalism is a comparison between our CMA model forecasts for regional equity markets and the actual outcomes over the decade.
As shown in Figure 8, US equities far outpaced modelled expectations. The realised return of 13% p.a. was nearly three times the forecast return of 4.5% p.a. — a striking deviation not only from our projections but also from the long-run historical average. In the 100 years to 2014, US equities returned 7% p.a. With US equities making up over half the global market at the start of the period and approximately 2/3 at the end of the period, this underestimate for the US equity market also resulted in a (smaller) underestimate for the global equity market.
In contrast, the model’s forecasts for other regions proved consistently overoptimistic. While returns for European and Japanese equities fell within expected error bands, outcomes for the UK — and especially emerging markets — were notably weaker than anticipated.
Figure 8: Regional equity forecasts and realised returns, 10 years to 31 December 2024, USD converted terms

Source: Ninety One (internal calculations based on Bloomberg and MSCI data).
Forecasts for individual markets are subject to larger errors than forecasts for the global equity market given the scope for greater impact from idiosyncratic factors. When assessing the ability of our approach to capture information about the prospective returns available in equities, it makes most sense to focus on the global market. Looking back at the modelled outcomes based on information which would have been available at the time and comparing those to the actual outcomes, Figure 9 demonstrates a strong linear relationship with little suggestion of results being skewed towards either over- or under-optimism. The fact that there are notable errors in individual 10 year periods is to be expected given the high degree of uncertainty inherent in the exercise and the scope for markets to deviate from a consistent pricing of long-term fundamentals at times of excessive fear or greed.
Each dot in Figure 9 represents the period aligned to our 6-monthly update schedule with the red dot showing the 10-year period starting on 30 September 2014 or essentially the same period as that covered by this analysis of US exceptionalism. This period was the largest single underestimate in the historic data going back 30 years, which further underlines the uniqueness of this episode.2
Figure 9: 10-year forecast vs. actual equity returns — rolling periods from March 1995 to March 2015
10-year local currency, return forecast

Source: Ninety One (internal calculations based on Bloomberg and Moody’s data).
To understand how these outcomes diverged so sharply from expectations, we break down the actual outcomes in Figure 10. The US market saw by far the largest positive revaluation and second-highest growth in earnings after Japan. The scale of the valuation uplift change stands out: only the UK and emerging markets (EM) experienced modest gains, while valuations were flat in Europe ex-UK and declined in Japan.
The US dollar appreciated against all other regional currencies, amplifying the extent of US outperformance when measured in common currency terms without hedging. Equity and FX effects were closely intertwined — the strength of the US economy and equity market helped drive capital flows into the US, reinforcing demand for the dollar relative to other currencies.
Figure 10: Drivers of regional equity returns, 10 years to 31 December 2024, USD converted

Source: Ninety One (internal calculations based on Bloomberg and MSCI data).
We can break dividend per share growth into four components: aggregate revenue growth, margin changes, payout ratio changes, and market composition impacts (MCI), as shown in Figure 11. The most striking divergence appears at the revenue line. US revenue growth was solid and broadly in line with expectations, but revenues were flat over the decade in Europe and declined outright in Japan and the UK. EM posted slightly higher revenue growth than the US, though as we have examined in more detail, this was offset by a larger-than-expected drag from market composition changes.
Margin expansion contributed positively across all regions and was, in fact, more significant in developed markets outside the US.
Figure 11: Drivers of growth, 10 years to 31 December 2024, local currency terms

Source: Ninety One (internal calculations based on Bloomberg and MSCI data).
US equity returns stand out for the extent to which they exceeded both our CMA forecasts and long-run historical benchmarks. The primary drivers of this outperformance were a substantial revaluation and a stronger US dollar, as global capital flowed into US equities. These were underpinned by solid fundamentals: US revenues, earnings and dividends grew faster than in other regions.
Importantly, US growth was not exceptional by historical standards. Rather, it was the relative weakness of other markets — especially the stagnation in developed market revenues outside the US — that made the US performance appear so dominant.
European growth prospects
The stagnation in European revenue growth over the past decade is exceptional — for all the wrong reasons. Alongside geopolitical pressures, it has fuelled a growing imperative for policymakers to shift the continent’s economic trajectory.
At a time of heightened uncertainty and with significant policy change, it is difficult to forecast how these efforts will translate into growth. What the CMA framework can offer is perspective: a long-term, data-driven context to ground expectations.
To this end, we look as far back as the data allows — tracking the progression of dividends over more than 50 years. This long view reveals just how unusual the post-GFC period has been. Since 2008, dividend growth in Europe has stalled. This stands in stark contrast to the previous four decades when dividend growth followed a remarkably steady, near-linear trend.
Figure 12 shows the trailing 12-month dividends per share for the MSCI Europe index in log terms. The 15-year trend measure used is the same one that underpins our CMA estimates of underlying dividend growth. On a log scale, the steady trend from 1970 to 2008 suggests a consistent growth rate in Europe’s dividend-paying capacity over that period.
If the factors suppressing growth post-GFC prove temporary, there may be scope for Europe to rejoin its historical trend — a return to a more normal growth environment.
Figure 12: MSCI Europe dividends per share (log scale)

Source: Ninety One (internal calculations based on MSCI data) as at 31 March 2025.
This long-term view also helps put the US experience in perspective. Figure 13 shows that the recent US growth outcome, while strong, is not historically unusual. The progression of trend dividends in the US market has followed a remarkably consistent path since 1970, reinforcing the idea that recent performance reflects continuity rather than a structural break.
Figure 13: MSCI USA dividends per share (log scale)

Source: Ninety One (internal calculations based on MSCI data) as at 31 March 2025.
Japan, the other developed market with a long dividend history, offers a useful parallel to Europe. After its stock market and real estate collapse in the early 1990s, Japan entered a prolonged period of stagnation — dividends per share did not surpass their 1991 level until 2005. What followed, however, was a striking corporate renaissance. A combination of governance reforms, improved capital discipline, and stronger shareholder focus helped drive a sustained recovery. Dividend growth reaccelerated, and the long-run trend rose to a level well above that seen in the 1970s and 1980s.
Figure 14: MSCI Japan dividends per share (log scale)

Source: Ninety One (internal calculations based on MSCI data) as at 31 March 2025.
In conclusion, the US equity market was truly unique over the past decade — both in the scale of its re-rating and in its relative growth performance against a weak global backdrop. Our CMA forecasts point to a partial reversal of the valuation expansion and to dividend growth more in line with long-run trends in revenue and per capita GDP. If this plays out, the return profile for US equities is likely to be significantly lower over the next decade.
In contrast, the exceptional growth story — albeit of a different kind — was in Europe, where it took 15 years for dividends to recover sustainably above their pre-GFC peak. But both Europe’s longer-term history and Japan’s recovery from its own lost decade suggest that a return to moderate, through-the-cycle growth is a reasonable central case for European equities.
Taken together, our process points to similar return expectations for US and European equities over the coming decade — a potential period of convergence after an era of unusually wide divergence.
2 The largest absolute error by contrast was an overestimate for the period starting on 31 March 1999 where the model predicted a return of +2.1% but the actual outcome was -1.6% per annum.