The Fed’s change of tone
Russell Silberston – Strategist
Having been resolutely dovish in the aftermath of its recent monetary policy review, the US Federal Reserve (Fed) has become incrementally more hawkish in recent communications. Specifically, focus has turned to the risk management of recent upside surprises to inflation prints and the possibility these lead to expectations becoming separated from the 2% target. The Fed’s central view is that the unprecedented conditions of opening an economy after a global pandemic is creating supply bottlenecks and large spikes in some prices but that these effects will fade with time. As such, it would be unwise to slow the economy prematurely by raising interest rates or pulling back on asset purchases. However, in a series of recent speeches, members freely admit that, given the unique circumstances, their analysis may be wrong, and were this the case they have the tools to bring inflation back down. In practice, this commitment should limit the upside to the level of implied inflation in bond markets.
The second communication change was focused on the level of asset purchases, which have been running at US$120 billion a month and will continue “until substantial further progress has been made toward the Committee’s maximum employment and price stability goals”. But with inflation comfortably above target, albeit temporarily, the housing market booming and the labour market slowly but surely normalising, the focus of June’s Federal Open Market Committee meeting shifted toward defining what the vague “substantial further progress” test actually means in practice. This is a debate for up and coming Committee meetings, but it is a clear signal that the starting pistol has been fired for the Fed to begin thinking about tapering asset purchases, while stressing this process will be “orderly, methodical and transparent” with an aim of avoiding the ‘taper tantrum’ experienced in 2013. Whilst being dependent on economic data outcomes, we expect the Committee to preannounce its plans in September, with the actual tapering starting around year-end and lasting for 12 months.
According to the Hutchins Centre Fiscal Impact Measure, having boosted economic growth by 8.6% in the first three months of the year, fiscal policy turned into a modest headwind in the second quarter, detracting 0.7% from growth. We flagged this as a major risk in our January edition, and continue to expect policy will be increasingly negative going forward as emergency spending is unwound.
China sticks to her guns
China continued with her ‘consistency, stability and sustainability’ mantra during the second quarter. Economic growth has clearly slowed in recent months, but this simply reflects base effects from last year’s blockbuster performance, coupled with some specific and targeted macro-prudential measures that are seeking to take some of the froth out of the housing market and aid the deleveraging of local government financing. Beyond this, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) kept liquidity neutral, in line with the need to stabilise debt to GDP at its current level. Looking forward, there is little reason to expect any major change in Chinese monetary or fiscal policy; growth and money supply are slowing to more sustainable levels, and whilst producer price inflation is certainly very high, there is little sign of this feeding through to consumer prices. Policy will therefore be focused on strategic sectors, such as complex manufacturing investment and rural development, whilst continuing to ensure that excess leverage is addressed by targeted measures.
ECB sees a turning point
European Central Bank (ECB) executive board members felt confident enough in the eurozone economic outlook to state that “we have reached a turning point”, buoyed by a fast roll out of COVID-19 vaccinations (after a very shaky start), strong economic survey sentiment and an expectation that fiscal and monetary policy will continue to provide strong tailwinds to this recovery. Financial markets, of course, had come to much the same conclusion and were forcing bond yields and the euro higher.
With the ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme seeking to ensure financial conditions are compatible with the economic outlook, its multi-dimension reaction function becomes harder to determine, but in June the Governing Council decided to continue purchasing assets at much the same pace as that enacted in March, this being approximately 80 billion euros per month. However, at this pace the 1.85 trillion euro ‘envelope’ will be exhausted before its envisaged end date of March 2022. As such, it is only a question of time before the ECB is forced to slowdown the pace of purchases in the coming months. In the meantime, the central bank continues to supress bond yields, ensuring governments are able to fund themselves favourably during a time of crisis.
At the end of May, the EU ratified the 673 billion euro economy recovery facility, a central plank of the Next Generation EU Fund, and so began a historic programme of jointly issued debt. Whilst small in the context of US and Japanese fiscal responses, it still feels the EU has taken a step that would have been unthinkable just five years ago.
No reason to expect Japan to deviate
After several years of aggressive monetary policy easing, in March the Bank of Japan (BoJ) moved to ensure it could continue to provide enough accommodation going forward without increasing the negative side effects of its actions further. In practice, this can be thought of as ‘less is more’ and makes policy nimbler and more reactive to financial conditions rather than being permanently operating. This was further enhanced in June by rolling over the favourable bank loan scheme for a further six months to March 2022. These loans, along with holdings of short-term treasury bills, has been one of the fastest growing items on the BoJ’s balance sheet, with outstanding bank loan amounts standing at 129 trillion yen at the month end, an increase of 80.5 trillion yen since December 2019. Looking forward, with inflation expected to remain low for several months and the economic outlook lacklustre, there is little reason to expect the BoJ to deviate from its current path, which has seen its balance sheet grow by 0.6% per month post-March, a pace in excess of inflation.
Bank of England considers a different route
The Bank of England became far more optimistic about the economic outlook in May, revising its expectations for 2021 GDP up to 7.25% from the 5.00% expected in February. This, of course, was in reaction to the rapid vaccination programme, looser fiscal policy and a better economic outcome than originally feared from the first quarter lockdown. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), however, remains firmly focused on the medium-term outlook, rather than the large dislocations in both supply and demand that are washing through the UK as we come through the other side of the pandemic. As such, minutes from the most recent MPC stated that “policy should both lean strongly against downside risks to the outlook and ensure that the recovery was not undermined by a premature tightening in monetary conditions”. However, with the UK having underperformed other major economies in recent years, we expect pent-up demand to assert itself over the coming years, and with limited supply capacity, the Bank may well be forced to tighten monetary policy earlier than other policymakers.
One outstanding action point from the MPC’s ‘to do’ list is its exit strategy from quantitative easing. Pre-COVID, it committed to not reduce the size of its balance sheet until Bank Rate reached a level from which it could be reduced meaningfully. This level was deemed to be 1.5%, but an assessment is currently being undertaken to determine if this needs to be lower. It is therefore possible that the UK takes a different ‘Pandexit’ route, by hiking Bank Rate once or twice and then focusing on allowing its holdings of gilts and corporate bonds to mature, thereby shrinking its balance sheet. We expect to get clarity over this issue in the coming months.